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PRIVACY, FREE SPEECH, AND “BLURRY-
EDGED” SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Lauren Gelman* 
Abstract: Much of Internet-related scholarship over the past ten years has 
focused on the enormous benefits that come from eliminating interme-
diaries and allowing user generated one-to-many (one person to many 
people) communications. Many commentators have noted the tension 
created between the positive benefits for free speech and the negative ef-
fects on user privacy. This tension has been exacerbated by technologies 
that permit users to create social networks with “blurry edges” —places 
where they post information generally intended for a small network of 
friends and family, but which is left available to the whole world to access. 
The thought is that someone the user cannot identify a priori might find 
the information interesting or useful. These technological advances have 
created enormous benefits as people connect to each other and build 
communities online. The technology that enables these communities, 
however, also creates an illusion of privacy and control that the law fails to 
recognize. This Article discusses the technological, social, and legal re-
gimes that have created this framework, and proposes a technical solution 
to permit users to maintain networks with blurry edges while still appro-
priately balancing speech and privacy concerns. 
Introduction 
 One of the many important aspects of the Internet is the “many-to-
many” communication it enables—allowing individuals to distribute a 
message to many recipients at once.1 For the first time in history, the 
economics of publishing place the individual speaker on even ground 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2009, Lauren Gelman. Lauren Gelman served as Executive Director of Stanford 
Law School’s Center for Internet and Society and a Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law 
School until June 2009. Thanks to Lawrence Lessig, Mark Lemley, Ryan Calo, Chris Hoo-
fanagle, James Grimmelmann, and participants at the Publicity, Privacy, and Intellectual 
Property Meet the First Amendment Symposium at Boston College Law School and the 
2008 Privacy Law Scholars Conference for their thoughtful input. 
1 David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Lim-
ited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal. F. 139, 162; Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, 
Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 833, 
834 (2006). 
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with institutional speakers.2 For a reasonable fee and with limited tech-
nical skills, any person can tell her story to the world.3 
 Every day users upload personally identifiable pictures, movies, 
data, and stories to the web. A complex and often relatively complete 
“digital dossier” of some individuals can be assembled from their up-
loads.4 These are not dossiers compiled by covert spies skulking in dark 
corners with penlight cameras, nor by government agents scouring the 
data files held by big data aggregators.5 Rather, these dossiers are the 
result of sometimes extraordinary personal accounts of life’s ups and 
downs told in the first person.6 Although some people would not share 
these stories with individuals they had not known, many individuals do 
post detailed accounts of their lives on a medium that is accessible to 
millions.7 
 In his book, Here Comes Everybody, Clay Shirky describes blog posts 
he found online during the course of daily web surfing.8 These posts 
range from the mundane to unintelligible.9 According to Shirky, the 
reason these posts appear completely uninteresting and a waste of time 
is that “[t]hey’re not talking to you.”10 This proposition is both utterly 
profound and at the same time obvious. Some content on the Internet 
is not written for me, yet I can still access it. Which begs the question: 
why do people post content on a medium available to the whole world 
when that content is not intended for the whole world? 
 The answer lies in what I call “blurry-edged social networks.” A 
simple non-Internet example of this is listing one’s phone number in 
the white pages. In general, individuals do not want to receive calls 
from people they do not want to talk to. This would suggest that every 
residential phone customer would want to have an unlisted number 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Perzanowski, supra note 1, at 853–54. 
3 Dan Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the 
People, at xii (2004). 
4 Daniel Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Informa-
tion Age 1–2 (2004). 
5 Id. at 3–5. 
6 Daniel Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the 
Internet 5–6 (2007); see, e.g., Amalah: Blog, http://www.amalah.com (description of child’s 
difficulty in school) (last visited Oct. 26, 2009); Breed’em and Weep: Blog, http://breedem 
andweep.com (description of going through a divorce and suffering from bipolar disorder) 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009); Dooce: Blog, http://dooce.com (description of mental break-
down following birth of first child) (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
7 See supra note 6. 
8 Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Or-
ganizations 81–83 (2008). 
9 See id. 
10 Id. at 85. 
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and may even pay for such a privilege.11 However, the problem with 
that approach is that it is impossible to know in advance everyone who 
fits into the category of people with whom one does not wish to speak. 
To put it another way, the social cost of not receiving phone calls from 
someone you fail to identify a priori as being in your social network out-
weighs the harm of having to answer the phone and hang up on tele-
marketers.12 
 Of course, some people do have unlisted phone numbers. I am 
one such person. I assume that people who want to reach me will find a 
way, or that the cost of a failed connection is worth the avoiding the 
potential harm from unsolicited calls. The cost-benefit calculation that 
is part of this decision depends on how we rate our ability to identify 
the set of people with whom we do want to speak. 
 This same calculus may be driving many of people to post personal 
details on their blogs, pictures on Flickr, movies on YouTube, and place 
material on the other social networking utilities Web 2.0 has made 
available.13 There are equally available, free options to post the same 
content on password-protected applications, yet some people choose 
the available-to-the-world option.14 For example, some new moms and 
dads post their baby pictures in a photostream on the photo-sharing 
website Flickr instead of either using Flickr’s password protection op-
tion, or a free website like Shutterfly.com that allows users to restrict 
access.15 Yet no matter how cute the picture of the first bath is, it is 
unlikely to be directed at the whole world. 
 So why choose the public option? Similar to the choice people face 
between listing or not listing one’s phone number, Internet users are 
calculating that they are unlikely to identify a priori all the people they 
intend to reach with their posts because their social network is unde-
fined. To take advantage of this “blurry edge,” given the choice of the 
binary options the Internet currently offers—making information 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Marc Lifsher, A Proposed Ban on Fees for Unlisted Numbers Put on Hold, L.A. Times, 
May 6, 2009, at B7. 
12 See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006) (regulating 
unsolicited telemarketing calls). 
13 See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Why I Blog, Atlantic, Nov. 2008, at 106. 
14 See Pamela Paul, The New Family Album, Time, Apr. 12, 2004, at A1. 
15 See Flickr Privacy Policy, http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/flickr/details. 
html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009); Shutterfly Privacy Policy, http://www.shutterfly.com/ 
help/privacy.jsp (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). 
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available to the world, or password-protecting it for a perfectly defined 
set—Internet posters are choosing the former.16 
 The problems with this choice are two-fold. First, the users’ assump-
tion that the information they post will only be accessed by people for 
whom it is written is—to use Shirkey’s language—mistaken.17 Most in-
formation on the Internet is captured, indexed, saved, and searchable.18 
Yet people continue to post. This notion of user postings as “semi-
private” may have been inherited from two distinct Internet fora, both 
of which predate Web 2.0, blogs, and modern social discovery sites:19 
these are message boards and personal web pages. Message boards allow 
users to connect with people with the same interests.20 Web pages per-
mit individuals unmediated communication with the world. When the 
two combined in what is commonly called Web 2.0, users imported the 
semi-private notion of a community without geography into applications 
that, by default, publish to a much greater audience.21 
 The second problem with users’ choices, and perhaps the more 
important reason to ask whether the current privacy regime is ade-
quate, is that the information individuals post online is rarely limited to 
identifying information about themselves. This is because one engaging 
aspect of people’s stories is that they usually involve others. There are 
few available legal protections, however, for the people about whom 
users post.22 Privacy law most often bends in the interest of promoting 
free speech.23 Thus, the person captured in the photograph posted on 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Information Revelation and Privacy in Online So-
cial Networks, in Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Elec-
tronic Society 74-–78 (Sabrina DeCapitani di Vimercati & Roger Dingledine eds., 2005). 
17 See Shirky, supra note 8, at 85. 
18 See Gross & Acquisti, supra note 16, at 79. 
19 See Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Gen-
eration of Software, Sept. 30, 2005, http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528–35 (2001) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects disclosure of contents of cellular telephone conversations that were 
obtained through a third party’s interception); Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 
1088, 1097 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (allowing poster on a message board to remain anonymous 
because no libelous statements were made); Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 
935, 939 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that publication by a newspaper of a photograph 
of people standing in line to collect unemployment compensation did not violate a state 
statute providing that a person has the right against unreasonable, substantial, or serious 
interference with his or her privacy; the appearance of a person in a public place necessar-
ily involved doffing the cloak of privacy that the law protects). 
23 See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 389 (2008); see, e.g., Os-
tergren v. McDonnell, No. 3:08CV362, 2009 WL 1608884, at *13 (E.D. Va. June 2, 2009) 
(permitting republication of public documents containing sensitive information, such as 
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Flickr has little recourse in law if he or she finds the posting offensive.24 
Even when people post information about themselves, the law refuses 
to recognize this information as “private” information published 
online, even if the intent was for limited disclosure.25 
 We thus find ourselves in a world where there are strong incentives 
for people to post personal information about themselves and others in 
a form made available broadly, in a medium where all data is saved and 
easily searchable. Opportunities to profess and protect the individual’s 
privacy interest, however, are limited. This Article asks whether we can 
protect the value captured by exploiting the blurry edge of our social 
networks while still maintaining the free speech protections and inno-
vative capacity of today’s Internet. 
 Part I suggests that the personal stories people share online are 
not a result of an innate exhibitionism, but rather of technology that 
creates an illusion of privacy and control that users can fall victim to.26 
Part II elaborates on blurry-edged social networks and the problem of 
protecting privacy while facilitating speech by analogizing the current 
situation to the one in copyright law.27 Part III looks at how the Internet 
has changed who makes decisions regarding what private information 
to publish and to which audience to publish it. Additionally, it exam-
ines how the law has failed to keep up with the realities of online publi-
cation.28 Finally, Part IV suggests a technical change—a tool—that 
would continue to incent users to capture the value of the blurry edge 
of their social network while promoting free speech interests.29 I sug-
gest that such a technical modification can lead to changes in privacy 
law that will permit users to make certain online disclosures without 
losing all privacy rights in those publications. 
                                                                                                                      
social security numbers, on the Internet); Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 382–83 (Ga. 
2002). But see Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1088 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (finding that the First Amendment does not protect a website that published 
names of doctors known to perform abortions). 
24 See, e.g., Noam Cohen, Use My Photo? Not Without My Permission, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 
2007, at C3 (advertising agency uses a photo posted on Flickr of a 15-year-old in one of its 
advertising campaigns); Eli Saslow, Teen Tests Internet’s Lewd Track Record, Wash. Post, May 
29, 2007, at A1 (high school athlete becomes victim of unwanted attention after photo of 
her is posted on sports blog). 
25 See, e.g., Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862–63 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
26 See infra notes 30–109 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 110–132 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 133–168 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 169–178 and accompanying text. 
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I. Technological Evolution 
 Is it true that we are all just inherently exhibitionistic?30 Or is there 
something about the Internet’s evolution that has created an illusion of 
privacy and control and an environment conducive to personal disclo-
sures? This question lies at the heart of whether the law should consider 
some disclosures on the Internet as intended for a limited audience.31 
 The early Internet offered two ways to communicate to the world. 
The first was message boards that connected individuals in disparate 
locations with others with similar interests. The second was the World 
Wide Web (the “Web”) that allowed users to speak to the world.32 When 
Web 2.0 technologies combined with the advent of powerful search 
tools, the combination shattered the technical and social divide be-
tween these two previously distinct technologies.33 The rapid nature of 
the transformation did not allow any time for Internet users to under-
stand the enormity of the changes that had occurred.34 This Part pre-
sents one story about the historical development of publication on the 
Internet and how it created an environment where users feel comfort-
able disclosing their private stories. 
A. Bulletin Board Systems and Usenet Newsgroups 
 Since the introduction of Internet technology, people have used 
computers to connect with other users with similar interests. What today 
is known as user-generated content was once confined to message board 
forums dedicated to groups with similar interests.35 On these forums, 
called Bulletin Board Systems (“BBS”), individuals could read topic-
specific message boards, where they could meet others with similar in-
terests, have discussions on various topics, publish articles, download 
software, and play games, all under a single application.36 The Whole 
Earth ‘Lectronic Link (“WELL”) launched in 1985 as a type of subscrip-
                                                                                                                      
30 See Andrew Keen, The Cult of the Amateur 16 (2007). 
31 See Daniel J. Solove, I’ve Got Nothing to Hide, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 745, 747–49 (2007); 
Wael Nawara, Facebook Blues and the Death of Privacy, Huffington Post, Sept. 14, 2000, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wael-nawara/facebook-blues-and-the-de_b_286265.html. 
32 See O’Reilly, supra note 19. 
33 Id. 
34 See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. Rev. 1605, 1629 (2007) (de-
scribing how changes in technology can have a greater impact than changes in the law). 
35 See Encyclopedia of New Media 47 (Steve Jones ed., 2003). 
36 Id. at 45–47. 
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tion BBS that aimed to create a virtual community.37 It also allowed its 
members to communicate in online forums called “conferences,” which 
were similar to BBS message boards.38 Originally, only members selected 
by staff could initiate a conference, but in 1995 the terms changed so 
any member could.39 Like a BBS, WELL membership was available to 
almost anyone, but required a paid subscription and use of one’s real 
name.40 Postings in any conference were available only to members, 
unless a user chose to release it to a wider audience on the burgeoning 
Internet.41 
 Usenet newsgroups are different in that they were available to any 
user with an Internet connection and an Internet Service Provider 
(“ISP”) that ran Usenet software.42 One did not need to be a member 
of an online community or connect to a BBS to start posting.43 Both 
Usenet and BBS applications, however, served the same purpose. Use-
net newsgroups linked individuals interested in fashion, religion, or TV 
shows.44 Anybody could post to a Usenet newsgroup.45 Although tech-
nologies allowing anonymous posting were available, it was common in 
most groups to post using one’s real name.46 Web-based archiving of 
Usenet posts did not begin until 1995, when Deja News launched a 
large, searchable archive.47 Ten-years later, the Usenet era substantially 
came to a close when AOL—a provider of Usenet services—announced 
that it would discontinue its integrated Usenet service in early 2005, 
citing the growing popularity of weblogs, chat forums, and online con-
ferencing.48 
                                                                                                                      
37 Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Steward Brand, the 
Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism (2008); see, e.g., Ency-
clopedia of New Media , supra note 35, at 481–82. 
38 Turner, supra note 37, at 6. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See Encyclopedia of New Media, supra note 35, at 457–59; Wendy G. Lehnert & 
Richard L. Kopec, Web 101, at 290–92 (3d ed. 2007). 
43 Encyclopedia of New Media, supra note 35, at 458. 
44 See Lehnert & Kopec, supra note 42, at 290–91. 
45 Encyclopedia of New Media, supra note 35, at 457. 
46 See Michael A. Caloyannides, Privacy Protection and Computer Forensics 
178–81 (2d ed. 2004); CyberSociety 2.0: Revisiting Computer-Mediated Communica-
tion and Community 55 (Steve Jones ed., 1998). 
47 Encyclopedia of New Media, supra note 35, at 458–59. 
48 Jim Hu, AOL Shutting down Newsgroups, CNet, Jan. 25, 2005, http://news.cnet.com/ 
AOL-shutting-down-newsgroups/2100-1032_3-5550036.html. 
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 BBSs and Usenet both date back to the very beginnings of the 
Internet.49 In fact, the Internet’s capacity to link users in disparate geo-
graphic communities with different interests was presaged by these 
technologies.50 Posting to the bulletin boards was public because most 
BBSs, and all of the Usenet groups, were open to the general public.51 
One was able to locate a group that was of interest, read the FAQ for 
the group to learn about its subject matter and any posting guidelines, 
and then jump right into the conversation.52 A user could go to a group 
about religion for example, and share intimate details about religious 
beliefs with an audience pre-disposed to wanting to hear those details 
and respond. The audience was not driven by the identity of the poster, 
but by a shared interest in the subject matter. If a user wanted to ex-
pand his or her network to include people outside his or her geo-
graphic location with similar religious beliefs or interest in discussing 
religious ideology, message boards provided that forum. 
B. The World Wide Web 
 The development of the World Wide Web (the “Web”) was differ-
ent. The early Web was less about finding other users with similar inter-
ests than about publication to the world. 
 Three elements came together by 1995 that made one-to-many 
publication possible: websites became easy to create, easy to publish, 
and easy to find.53 The 1993 release of a software application for navi-
gating the Web called Netscape Mosaic created a free and relatively in-
tuitive means to both access the newly forming graphical Web, and 
form a vision for one’s own website.54 The earliest websites were created 
by a small cadre of technology enthusiasts well versed in Hypertext 
Markup Language (“HTML”)—the language of the web.55 Thanks to 
the publication of books like HTML for Dummies, software programs 
such as FrontPage and Dreamweaver that created user-friendly inter-
faces for web page design, and a phenomenon that allowed users to 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Encyclopedia of New Media, supra note 35, at 45–46, 457–58. 
50 See id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 For example, Trellix Xorporation was created in late 1995 and was one of the early 
providers of website publishing technology and managed hosting services for small-business 
and personal websites. Its main product was Trellix Web Express, a server-based website au-
thoring system private labeled by web communities and hosting services. See Trellic Xorpora-
tion Home Page, http://www.trellix.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
54 See Encyclopedia of New Media, supra note 35, at 43–44. 
55 See id. at 19. 
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copy aspects of published websites, creating and maintaining one’s own 
website soon became doable for the average user.56 Publication re-
quired only procuring a web hosting service. Companies such as Yahoo! 
and Google were founded and helped make the Web searchable by 
creating directories and indexes of the growing web.57 
 The earliest websites were commercial in nature, but personal 
websites started to emerge as well. In 1997, in Reno v. American Civil Lib-
erties Union, the U.S. Supreme Court described the Internet by observ-
ing: “Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can 
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could 
from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and 
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”58 The 
potential of the Internet to amplify the speech of everyday people was a 
powerful cultural image.59 And it was the very public nature of the 
webpage that captured the imagination on the first generation of In-
ternet settlers in the late 1990s.60 
C. Web 2.0 
 BBSs, Usenet groups, and the Web came together in early 2000 to 
form what we now call Web 2.0.61 The modern blog evolved from the 
online diary, where people would keep a running account of their per-
sonal lives.62 Early weblogs were simply manually updated components 
of common websites.63 However, the evolution of tools to facilitate the 
production and maintenance of web articles posted in reverse chrono-
logical order made the publishing process feasible to a much larger, 
less technical population.64 The use of web browser-based software is 
now a typical aspect of “blogging” —publishing entries in a blog.65 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. at 20. See generally Ed Tittel & Stephen N. James, HTML for Dummies (3d ed. 
1997). 
57 Encyclopedia of New Media, supra note 35, at 401–03. 
58 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
59 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U L. Rev. 1, 33–34 (describing five characteristics of Internet 
speech that are exemplary of freedom of speech generally); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration 
of Independence for Cyberspace, Feb. 9, 1996, http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censor- 
ship_bills/barlow_0296.declaration (an influential paper written in 1996 describing how 
early cyber frontiersmen felt about the Internet). 
60 See O’Reilly, supra note 19. 
61 See id. 
62 See Encyclopedia of New Media, supra note 35, at 33–34. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
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Blogs can be hosted by dedicated blog hosting services, run by using 
log software, or on regular web hosting services.66 
 Blogging software heralded the Web 2.0 phenomenon.67 Finally, 
users had easy tools to publish to the web. All of the important free 
speech groundwork that had been laid could apply to technologies for 
individual users’ speech and not just the corporations that had rushed 
to populate the web with new ways to provide access to pornography.68 
Protecting such user-generated content was the aim of the activists that 
had argued Reno and similar cases.69 Now, users had the tools to start 
publishing. 
 Some blogs are written for a world-wide audience. Some are politi-
cal blogs where Washington “outsiders” became important political 
players by gaining wide audiences for perspectives that might never 
have been published by traditional media institutions.70 Yet another 
popular blog was the personal one.71 This form of publication had the 
look and feel of a diary. It was a very different notion of web publica-
tion than had existed for static web pages. The common understanding 
of a blog was for users to “get personal,” and blog posts tended to re-
semble posts on message boards and mailing lists.72 
 Building on the idea of a personal diary, users started sharing their 
most personal experiences. On “mommy blogs,” mothers share the 
everyday highs and lows of child rearing.73 Those with critical illnesses 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. 
67 See O’Reilly, supra note 19. O’Reilly explains: 
If an essential part of Web 2.0 is harnessing collective intelligence, turning 
the web into a kind of global brain, the blogosphere is the equivalent of . . . 
the voice we hear in all of our heads . . . . And as a reflection of conscious 
thought and attention, the blogosphere has begun to have a powerful effect. 
Id. 
68 See Cheryl B. Preston, The Internet and Pornography: What If Congress and the Supreme 
Court Had Been Comprised of Techies in 1995–1997?, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 61, 73–74. 
69 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870; Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Hails Su-
preme Court Victory in Internet Censorship Challenge ( June 27, 1997), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/privacy/speech/15493prs19970627.html. 
70 Rob Morse, Web Forum Shapes Political Thinking, S.F. Chron., Jan. 15, 2004, at A15. 
71 See Paul, supra note 14. 
72 See Karen McCullagh, Blogging: Self Presentation and Privacy, 17 Info. & Comm. Tech. 
L. 3, 8 (2008). In a 2007 online survey of bloggers, 58.4% said their blogs could be charac-
terized as describing “[m]y life (personal diary/journal).” Id. (“[T]he opportunity to con-
tinuously work on the project of the self via the interaction on blogs and comments to 
posts was the main reason why the majority of bloggers engaged in blogging.”) 
73 Ellen Lee, Motherhood Can Be Mother of Blogging, S.F. Chron., May 11, 2008, at C1. See, 
e.g., Just Another Mommy Blog, http://tracey-justanothermommyblog.blogspot.com (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2009); The Mommy Blog: Adventures from the Wonderbelly of Motherhood, 
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use blogs to share their stories.74 For any of life’s tough challenges, 
there could be a blogger writing online about her experiences with it. 
In some cases, individual bloggers use their own names, and name oth-
ers in their lives. In other cases, where people wish to hide their iden-
tity, their readers “unmask” them.75 
 Early on in blog publishing, people began to realize the potential 
repercussions of publishing private information on their blogs. A fa-
mous example of this is Heather Armstrong, who wrote a blog starting 
in 2001, Dooce.com, under her own name, and including some sensi-
tive and unflattering comments about her family and employer.76 On 
April 22, 2002, she stopped updating her blog, stating: 
There are several reasons that have led me to this decision, 
the biggest of which is that this website has caused more dam-
age and sorrow to my personal life than it has good. I can’t 
take it anymore. I’d love to be able to sit here and say that ar-
tistic expression and freedom are worth all the damage they 
have wreaked on the personal relationships I have with family, 
friends, neighbors and employers, but I cannot and will not. 
The people in my life just aren’t ready for it.77 
Her story was widely retold online and became part of Internet lore; 
according to the Urban Dictionary, getting “dooced” means to lose 
one’s job because of one’s website.78 
 Social networking software also brought the community elements 
of newsgroups and BBSs together with the public nature of the Web.79 
                                                                                                                      
http://themommyblog.net (last visited Oct. 26, 2009); MommyBlog, http://www.mommy 
blog.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
74 Benny Evangelista, Blogs: Baring Their Souls for the World to Read, S.F. Chron., Jan. 24, 
2005, at C1; see, e.g., Appendix Cancer Survivor Blog, http://appendix-cancer.blogspot.com 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009); Cancer Guy, http://www.cancerguy.com/blog (last visited Oct. 26, 
2009); Chronicles of a Cancer Patient, http://www.preservationrecords.com/blog (last vis-
ited Oct. 26, 2009). 
75 See, e.g., Brad Stone, A Mystery Solved: “Fake Steve” Is an Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 
2007, at C1. 
76 Dooce: Blog, http://www.dooce.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
77Untitled Posting, Dooce: Blog, http://web.archive.org/web/20020526121024/http:// 
dooce.com/ (Apr. 22, 2002). 
78 See Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are There Legal Protections for Employees Who 
Blog?, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 355, 357 (2007); Marc Cote, Note, Getting Dooced: Employee 
Blogs and Employer Blogging Policies Under the National Labor Relations Act, 82 Wash. L. Rev. 
121, 122–23 (2007); Elizabeth R. Rita & Eric. D. Gunning, Navigating the Blogosphere in the 
Workplace, Colo. Law., May 2005, at 55. 
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These software applications allow users to publish information in-
dented only for limited groups of “friends.”80 A primary reason users 
participate in these networks is to connect with people they cannot 
identify or find in advance, such as high school friends.81 Thus, these 
networks’ main value proposition is to help define their users’ blurry-
edged networks. 
 Facebook is a social networking website that allows registered users 
to connect through their platform.82 Upon creating an account, users 
are asked to submit personal information that will help others find 
them, as well as pictures, interests, date of birth, schools attended, rela-
tionship status, and similar personal details.83 This information is then 
made available to one’s contacts or friends.84 Using various privacy set-
tings, the user can choose what information can be seen by friends, 
friends of friends, all Facebook users, or only the individual user.85 One 
can also prevent individual contacts and friends from viewing a particu-
lar category of information.86 There is a wide variety of Facebook appli-
cations that allow users to participate in activities such as sharing videos 
they like, reviewing books, and playing online games.87 To use any ap-
plication, the user has to turn over her personal information to the ap-
plication developer.88 Similarly, Facebook itself also retains all the data 
that users provide to the site.89 
 The utility of the service is directly linked to how easy an individual 
user makes it for others to find her. For example, by becoming a part of 
the network for her high school, the user opens the door to reconnect-
                                                                                                                      
79 See Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, 13 J. Computer-Mediated Comm. 1, ¶ 11 (2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/ 
vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html. 
80 See O’Reilly, supra note 19. 
81 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1137, 1175 (2009); see, e.g., 
Classmates.com, http://www.classmates.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
82 See Grimmelmann, supra note 81, at 1142–49. 
83 See id. at 1149. 
84 See id. at 1149–50. 
85 See id. at 1145. 
86 See id. at 1146–47. 
87 See id. at 1147–50. 
88 Sarah Perez, What Facebook Quizzes Know About You, ReadWriteWeb: Blog, http:// 
www.readwriteweb.com/archives/what_facebook_quizzes_know_about_you.php (Aug. 27, 
2009, 7:29 EST). The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Northern California 
distributed a Facebook application “quiz” about privacy on Facebook applications that was 
designed, ironically, to raise user awareness about how much information users are forced 
to turn over to application developers. Id. 
89 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, http://www.facebook.com/terms. 
php (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
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ing with friends from that era of her life. Similarly, she can associate 
with her university, place of employment, or a professional or social ac-
tivity, such as attending a particular conference or supporting a social 
cause. By default, Facebook profiles are not searchable by those who 
are not users of Facebook.90 Additionally, users can delete their infor-
mation from the site at any time.91 Facebook’s Privacy Policy, however, 
does not address whether the company deletes the information from its 
records, or what happens to the data transferred to third-party applica-
tion developers.92 
 Several other social networking applications have sprung up to 
compete with Facebook. On one end of the spectrum is LinkedIn, a 
specialized site for professional networking.93 Although users might 
post photos of their children on Facebook, LinkedIn users join the site 
primarily for career-oriented activity. Lawyrs.net is an even more spe-
cialized site, designed to allow attorneys to network with other profes-
sionals.94 MySpace, on the other end of the spectrum, offers more op-
portunities to personalize one’s profile page, and has more applications 
focused at a youth community.95 
 Each of these sites allows some selection in what personal informa-
tion users disclose to other users.96 Thus, these sites have conquered the 
binary decision—whether to publish or keep private certain informa-
tion—that traditional news institutions, bloggers, and non-traditional 
intermediaries face. However, there are two problems with relying on 
this model to solve the privacy dilemma described above.97 First, these 
sites accomplish this task by using the property model of cutting them-
selves off from the rest of the Internet. Users must first become identifi-
able members of a social network, and then rely on that network to in-
                                                                                                                      
90 See Facebook, Privacy, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=419 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2009) (listing privacy options available to Facebook users). A Facebook user’s name, 
picture, and limited aggregated data about her profile are, however, available via third-party 
search engines like Google. Id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 LinkedIn, About Us, http://press.linkedin.com/about. (last visited Oct. 1, 2009); see 
Madeline Kriescher, Professional Benefits of Online Social Networking, Colo. Law., Feb. 2009, at 61. 
94 Lawyrs Home Page, https://www.lawyrs.net (last visited Oct. 1, 2009); see Kriescher, 
supra note 93, at 61. 
95 MySpace Home Page, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
96 Eszter Hargittai, Whose Space? Differences Among Users and Non-Users of Social Network 
Sites, 13 J. Computer-Mediated Comm. 1, ¶ 14 (2007). http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/ 
issue1/hargittai.html. 
97 See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, The 
Future of the Internet—And How to Stop It (2009). 
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novate and protect all of the personal information that they collect. Re-
liance on this model was artfully dismissed in Jonathan Zittrain’s The 
Future of the Internet—And How to Stop It.98 Zittrain explains how even 
when closed systems (like Facebook) allow applications to be created on 
top of the platform, they still maintain control by leaving open the pos-
sibility they could change the terms for application developers at any 
time.99 Applying Zittrain’s analysis, relying on closed systems for protect-
ing privacy online will impede innovation in privacy and have a detri-
mental effect generally on the “generativity” of the Internet.100 
 The second problem is that, as stated above, the purpose of these 
sites is to capture the economic benefit of users’ blurry-edged net-
works.101 Although this may be financially beneficial for the social net-
working companies, it may not be such a great deal for users.102 For ex-
ample, Facebook allows users to “tag” pictures to identify people in 
them.103 Users can also write on other users’ virtual “walls.”104 As I stated 
earlier, our stories are not only about ourselves, but are much richer 
when we identify other participants in our lives. This richness, however, 
comes with a price. The Facebook platform is built to incent users to 
disclose more information. The more users link to their friends, upload 
photos, and download and recommend applications, the more valuable 
the platform becomes.105 
 The community collaborates with the platform to push each mem-
ber to disclose more.106 Thus, the privacy controls are often designed to 
                                                                                                                      
98 See generally id. 
99 See id. at 184 (“Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the 
generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so 
all those who have built on top of their interfaces can continue to do so on equal terms.”). 
100 See id. By “generativity,” Zittrain means the “capacity for unrelated and unaccred-
ited audiences to build and distribute code and content through the Internet to its tens of 
millions of attached personal computers . . . . Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 
Harv. L. Rev. 1974, 1975 (2006). It is this connection between disparate users on a neutral 
platform that has led to the innovations in Internet applications we see online today. See id. 
101 See Grimmelmann, supra note 81, at 1155–57 (describing the norms and designs of 
social networks to illicit the most personal information from users). 
102 See id. at 1165–1178. 
103 Id. at 1145–46. 
104 Id. at 1145. 
105 See id. at 1155–57. 
106 James Grimmelmann describes seven proxies for privacy risks that people use on 
Facebook to help them navigate the novel environment. See id. at 1160–63. His excellent 
descriptions show how Facebook’s design takes advantage of the misperception inherent 
in the heuristics to induce more sharing of personal information and use of others’ infor-
mation. See id. 
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incent users not to deploy them.107 A study of college students found 
that between twenty and thirty percent did not know how Facebook’s 
privacy controls worked, how to change them, or even whether they 
themselves had ever charged them.108 It is socially difficult to say “no” to 
a friend request, so the basic information the user uploads generally 
becomes accessible to any Facebook member who can find that user. 
Invitations from friends to join groups or support causes are similarly 
hard to decline. Thus, it becomes increasingly challenging to maintain a 
profile that segregates disclosures suitable for work colleagues and those 
for high school friends. Herein lies the problem—the design of these 
sites creates an aura of privacy by suggesting they are for limited disclo-
sure of information to a defined social network of “friends.” The law, 
however, fails to recognize limited disclosures when they occur on a 
public network.109 
II. Social Evolution 
 This Article uses the term “blurry-edged” social networks to de-
scribe the simple fact that individuals cannot at any given moment list 
those people who comprise their social network. Thus, one’s social 
network comprises a finite set of nodes linked by discoverable interde-
pendencies such as “Lauren’s nuclear family” or “the students in Ms. 
Ames class,” and other nodes—such as “cancer survivors” or “mountain 
climbers” —that cannot be accurately enumerated. Persons who fit the 
latter categories might feel a kinship with others similarly situated, but 
they cannot list everyone with whom they are thus connected. Another 
example is that of a smoker: a person might be in the community of 
people sitting in a conference room who want to take a cigarette break, 
but unable to identify others in this category without stepping outside 
the room and publicly wielding a pack of cigarettes. 
 The personalization of the term “social networks” fits comfortably 
with the common use of the phrase social networking software or utility 
                                                                                                                      
107 See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Com-
puter Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 583, 589–97 (2006) (empha-
sizing the power of defaults). See generally Gross & Acquisti, supra note 16. 
108 Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information 
Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, in Privacy Enhancing Technologies 36, 52 (George 
Danezis & Philippe Golle eds., 2006). 
109 See, e.g., Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009). 
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described earlier.110 These services allow users to connect with other 
“members” of the service who they currently know or once knew, or 
those who share similar backgrounds and interests.111 Thus, these ser-
vices perform the function of giving form to members’ blurry-edged 
networks by connecting them with “friends” who share interdependent 
links. 
 For example, if I wish to tell a personal story about problems with 
my pregnancy, my social network might include people who know and 
care about me, as well as other women who have had similar problems 
and are looking for compatriots to discuss ways of dealing with such 
problems. It is impossible to identify who, in advance of sharing the 
story, fits in this latter category. 
 Prior to the advent of a global communications medium that any 
user could employ to tell her story, this was not a phenomenon that 
raised privacy issues. In the past, I might have identified members of 
this group by attending a private meeting organized by a hospital or 
through telling the story to close friends. Unless a news organization or 
other publisher chose to publish the details of my saga, I would have 
had to identify interested individuals first, and only then share. The 
Internet changed this. Today, I can disclose this information on my 
blog first, and then women who share my predicament can find me. In 
other words, I can capture the value of the blurry edge of my social 
network by announcing to the world the “node” I occupy and letting 
others with the same characteristics either initiate communication with 
me or benefit silently from reading my tale. Through this mechanism, I 
can increase my social network to those with similar interests but in 
disparate geographical locations. This creates enormous personal value 
for individuals who share their information online, and societal value as 
people connect or learn from others with similar interests. 
 To capture that value, however, one has to disclose their situation. 
My disclosure might be directed only at women who are situated simi-
larly to me, but the nature of the technology requires that I concur-
rently reveal it to anyone who can access the Internet.112 A privacy re-
                                                                                                                      
110 See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 79. Boyd and Ellison use “social network site” rather 
than “social networking site” because “participants are not necessarily ‘networking’ or 
looking to meet new people; instead, they are primarily communicating with people who 
are already a part of their extended social network.” Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See Danah Boyd, None of This Is Real: Identity and Participation in Friendster, in Struc-
tures of Participation in Digital Culture 132 ( Joe Karaganis ed., 2007) (describing 
the fakester phenomenon). A “fakester” profile is one that is created for a non-existent 
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gime that interprets public disclosure as an absolute bar to any subse-
quent privacy right claimed in the information creates disincentives for 
privacy-conscious users to use the medium to capture the value of the 
blurry edge of their social networks. 
 Courts have struggled with this problem as they have tried to strike 
a balance between public and private facts.113 The most hefty of the pri-
vacy torts—public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclu-
sion—recognize disclosure as transforming a private fact into a public 
one, and there is no protection for republication of public facts.114 Un-
der this regime, once a private fact is disclosed on the Internet, anyone 
is free to republish it.115 
 The phenomenon of publishing to round out the blurry edge of 
one’s social network raises another privacy problem: As the aforemen-
tioned discussion illustrates our stories are not only about ourselves. A 
Flickr user’s photostream tells her story through pictures. But photos 
can be captioned or tagged to identify individuals in the pictures. A 
particular irony with photographs is that often the photographer, who 
is not in the picture, is the only person with any rights to prevent its re-
publication, and the person of who the photograph was taken has no 
                                                                                                                      
person, or an unauthorized profile claiming to be someone other than the author, such as 
a pet or a celebrity. Grimmelmann, supra note 81, 1152-–53. 
113 See, e.g., Kilgore v. Younger, 640 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1982) (holding that California law 
provides an absolute privilege for publications made by an attorney general in the dis-
charge of an official duty); Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 61 P.3d 606 (Idaho 2002) (finding 
the facts disclosed by a publication—including the post office box used by Steele for pur-
poses of the taxpayer coalition and the Aryan Nations’ legal defense fund, the relocation 
of Steele from California to Idaho, and that he is a licensed Idaho attorney—are not pri-
vate facts but were readily available from public sources); Howard v. Des Moines Register & 
Trib. Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979) (finding a person identified as a victim of forced 
sterilization in a county mental facility was a good example of investigative journalism and 
was the subject of grave public interest); Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 564 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he alleged epithet, although offensive, revealed about plaintiff 
only that he was black. . . . [T]here are no allegations that Mr. Ledsinger’s race was in the 
nature of a private fact. . . . Thus, plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for inva-
sion of privacy.”). 
114 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. b (2009); see, e.g., Steinbuch v. Cut-
ler, 518 F.3d 580, 586 (8th Cir. 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s publication of private facts 
claim against defendant because defendant did nothing but blog about a matter that was 
already public); cf. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) 
(finding plaintiff was defamed when defendant announced plaintiff had AIDS on a televi-
sion talk show even though his medical status was known to a small community of friends, 
family, and other supporters). 
115 See, e.g., Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 859 (R.I. 1998) (“There is no liability [for 
publication of private facts] when the defendant merely gives further publicity to informa-
tion about the plaintiff that is already public.”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 652D cmt. b). 
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mechanism in law to assert any interest.116 Blog posts also reveal highly 
personal information about third parties. Copyright law provides strong 
protections to authors to prevent subsequent uses of their works.117 Pri-
vacy law presumes that most pictures are taken of public acts and there-
fore represent public disclosures where there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.118 As a result, the law offers minimal protections to 
individuals who believe their privacy has been invaded because of a 
compelling concern about the free speech interests of the posters.119 
 The constitutional mandate on government to refrain from im-
peding speech tends to implicate other values that we cherish.120 The 
final part of this Article proposes that law and technology should work 
together to offer users ways to notify readers of how they intend their 
publications to be used, and offer aggrieved parties a means to notify 
publishers that they would prefer content to be removed. Each pro-
posal, however, attaches potential harms to free speech. 
 Here, there are lessons that can be taken from the experience of 
balancing copyright and speech interests in the Internet age. My ability 
to protect my privacy may interfere with your ability to speak your life 
story, just as the monopoly control over words I speak granted by copy-
right law interferes with your ability to speak those words to convey a 
different meaning.121 The combination of the doctrine of fair use and 
litigation tools such as the preliminary injunction allow copyright own-
ers and subsequent speakers to “duke it out” in negotiations and in the 
                                                                                                                      
116 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. d; see, e.g., Nelson v. Maine Time, 
373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1997) (holding the publication by a newspaper of the smiling 
face of a young boy of Indian origin set against the background of woods and water dis-
closed nothing not otherwise available to the public and thus did not constitute an inva-
sion of privacy). 
117 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). See generally Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 
(9th Cir. 2000); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
118 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. d. But see Helen Nissenbaum, Pri-
vacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 119, 136–50 (2004). Nissenbaum’s description 
of contextual integrity offers a wonderful refutation of this claim in the context of video 
surveillance. See id. Her theory has been applied to privacy issues on Facebook. See generally 
Gordon Hull et al., Contextual Gaps: Privacy Issues on Facebook (University of North Carolina 
at Charlotte Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427546. 
119 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 
1149, 1190 (2005). 
120 See, e.g., id.; Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1559, 1564 (2000). 
121 See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537, 2617–21 
(2009). 
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courtroom to make sure that the values of free speech and inducing 
speech through economic monopoly are equally balanced.122 
 The Internet threw a wrench in those procedural protections for 
copyright owners. The elimination of distribution intermediaries meant 
that any user could post her speech to the world, even if it was speech 
someone else spoke first. And if it lacked the creative quotient the fair 
use doctrine required, copyright owners were left with the task of find-
ing the often anonymous speakers and bearing the economic costs that 
could not be recouped through the liability regime. The social role in-
termediaries played in assuring that copyrighted content was not unlaw-
fully distributed vanished, and copyright owners were left alone to pro-
tect their work without a useful ally.123 
 The same story can be told about privacy. Prior to the advent of 
the Internet era, individuals lacked the technological megaphone to 
broadcast their story to the world. Instead, their content was filtered 
through news or other publishing intermediaries.124 These entities 
played an important social role in balancing the newsworthiness of in-
formation against the privacy interests of third parties who were identi-
fied.125 Now, individuals can no longer rely on intermediaries to filter 
privacy-invasive content with no “newsworthy” purpose from reaching a 
mass audience. 
 The social toll, however, of eliminating intermediaries falls differ-
ently in copyright and privacy. Copyright law provides a broad protec-
tion covering all content “fixed in a tangible medium” for the life of the 
author plus seventy years.126 The formation and popularity of Creative 
Commons demonstrates that many users are not interested in protect-
ing their works with the full bundle of rights copyright law automati-
cally confers.127 Similarly, the debate over Orphan Works—works that 
remain under copyright protection but whose author cannot be 
                                                                                                                      
122 There is excellent work on areas where the goals of copyright and privacy conflict. 
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 Berkley Tech. L.J. 575 (2003). Here I am 
focused on their relationship to free speech ideals. 
123 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 
347, 347 (2005); Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices for User-Generated Content, 13 J. 
Internet. L. 1, 20–21 (2009). 
124 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286–92 (1964); see also Gill-
mor, supra note 3, xii. 
125 See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 
126 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302 (2006). 
127 Creative Commons is a system that permits users to voluntarily relinquish some of 
their copyright interests. See generally Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New In-
termediaries, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 45 (discussing the role of Creative Commons’ licenses). 
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found—shows that many people are not interested in asserting their 
rights for the full term copyright confers.128 Although the Internet 
places a greater burden on copyright owners in asserting their rights, it 
also creates enormous social good from innovation. Not just in oppor-
tunities to create fair uses, but in incentives to limit one’s copyrights to 
allow others to access and reuse speech. 
 In contrast, the Internet has created incentives for people to pub-
lish personal information to the world, without any corresponding 
tools to prevent such speech when it harms a privacy interest. Users, 
like copyright owners, are left without a valuable ally to protect their 
privacy. However, unlike copyright owners, individuals are ill equipped 
to negotiate this new challenge. The laws that protect privacy are far 
narrower than copyright law.129 Individuals are less likely to have law-
yers on retainer to protect their interest.130 And more importantly, 
there is no inherent monetary value in most private information that 
can be recouped when it is disclosed.131 So although copyright owners 
have strong legal protections, with a robust statutory damages regime 
to weigh in determining whether to protect the value of the copy-
righted work against a purported infringer, individuals have weak laws 
and uncertain economic value to weigh when determining whether to 
pursue an action against someone who revealed private information 
about them. 
 The analogy between copyright and privacy interests is significant 
here because of the important and substantial benefits to speech the 
unmediated Internet permits. Persuasive scholarship asserts that the 
additional cost borne by copyright owners as a result of an open end-to-
end architecture is outweighed by the social good, innovation, and eco-
nomic benefit of the past decade.132 The current privacy legal regime, 
however, coupled with the incentives to capture the benefits of blurry-
                                                                                                                      
128 See generally U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works (2006), available 
at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf. 
129 Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1130 (1990). 
130 Privacy torts tend to protect personal interests while copyright actions are frequently 
about commercial interests. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Finding (More) Privacy Protection in 
Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 8, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/ 
Symposia/Privacy/99_VS_8/fsarticle.htm. 
131 See, e.g., Manville v. Borg-Warner Corp., 418 F.2d 434, 437 (10th Cir. 1969) (plaintiff 
in a privacy suit can recover without proof of special damage and without proving general 
damages in specific amounts). 
132 See generally CODE: Collaborative Ownership and the Digital Economy (Rishab 
Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005); Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (2000); 
Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of 
Economic Production, 114 Yale L.J. 273 (2004). 
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edged social networks, leaves users who find speech online that affects 
their privacy in a far different posture than that of the copyright owner. 
III. Legal Evolution 
 The body of law that addresses publication of private information 
evolved in a very different environment than exists today. In particular, 
courts that have addressed decisions to publish information later 
claimed to be private were largely addressing decisions made by institu-
tional publishers and whether the facts they published were newswor-
thy.133 Courts that examined whether information was kept private by 
the plaintiff did not have to consider publication intended for a limited 
audience made on a public medium.134 Here I consider these two ques-
tions and offer examples to show why the current law might not be 
adequate to protect individuals’ privacy. 
A. Choice of What to Publish 
 Newspapers and other publishers have traditionally served as insti-
tutional barriers between people who wanted to speak and their in-
tended audience. For one’s message to travel beyond the water cooler 
or town square, a speaker had to find an entity with a business model 
sufficient to bear the costs of the technology necessary for one-to-many 
communication. The Internet eradicated that barrier. With transmis-
sion costs no longer at issue, any speaker could communicate anything 
to the world, at times anonymously. In essence, the individual became 
the sole decider of what was newsworthy. And there are fewer physical 
or technical limitations on the amount of content that can be pub-
lished. 
                                                                                                                      
133See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972); see also Edward Lee, Freedom of 
the Press 2.0, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 309, 339-51 (2008). 
134 See, e.g., M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623, 632 (2001) (“[T]he claim 
of a right of privacy is not ‘so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define one’s 
circle of intimacy—to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask.’ Information 
disclosed to a few people may remain private.”) (quoting Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 25 (1994)). 
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 The social benefits of this are enormous and well documented.135 
There are, however, costs as well. The very notion of newsworthiness 
inheres a balancing that some content is not newsworthy: that there 
exists limitations on what news institutions will publish and delegate to 
a category they choose, based on institutional capacity, not to publish. 
It is clear that the choice is binary: either publish information and 
make it part of the public record, or do not publish and keep the in-
formation private. 
 The legal doctrine of newsworthiness developed in this binary 
framework.136 Courts are frequently willing to find that the institution’s 
choice to publish information is itself a sufficient sign of newsworthi-
ness.137 It is, ironically, the latter that is most important to this discus-
sion of privacy. News organizations’ institutional message is to convey 
information. But even the most famous of the newspapers’ slogans, “All 
the news that’s fit to print,” implies that equally important is the de-
termination not to print information.138 News organizations make deci-
sions not to publish information regularly. 
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 This delegation makes sense. Sensationalist journalism is usually 
turned towards the already famous; individuals who are already in the 
public eye and about whom the public is interested, and who generally 
have the resources to assert their privacy interests where reporting steps 
over the line.139 More traditional news reporting balances privacy inter-
ests writ large against the need of the public to know. Of course, in a 
world of unlimited column inches, it is easy to criticize the role of in-
termediaries in making decisions about what the public needs to know. 
However, even as that barrier is eliminated today, the editorial judg-
ment exercised by institutional journalists is valued.140 
 There are several reasons proffered to explain this value. The one 
that this Article focuses on is the mission of news institutions. We as-
sume that the free speech goals that society values will be furthered by 
the media. Of particular interest here is the judgment exercised to de-
termine when to print private facts or personally identifiable informa-
tion about individuals, or documentary or other evidence that the gov-
ernment deems private. Internet applications that allow users to 
directly communicate with a mass audience leave the decision to pub-
lish or not publish this type of information to individuals or institutions 
with very different missions than traditional news institutions. This 
raises the question of whether a legal regime developed around binary 
choices made by institutions with news-distributing missions and lim-
ited space to publish makes sense given today’s technologies.141 
 This methodology breaks down when publication space is unlim-
ited and newsworthiness determinations are made by individuals or 
entities with different goals than traditional news institutions.142 As an 
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example, consider the case of Megan Meier, a 13-year old user of 
MySpace. After a falling out with a friend, the friend’s mother and 
babysitter created a false account for a young boy named Josh who pre-
tended to be in love with Megan.143 After exchanging numerous mes-
sages, “Josh” told Megan: “This world would be a better place without 
you.”144 Megan committed suicide the next day.145 There was no report-
ing about the case for a year as police investigated the crime.146 After 
Megan’s aunt told the story to the St. Louis Dispatch, a press frenzy en-
sued.147 The newspaper chose not to publish the name of Meier’s 
friend’s mother—Lori Drew, who was under investigation at that time— 
to protect the privacy of her daughter.148 Within hours, however, blog-
gers posted photographs, telephone numbers, e-mail details, and ad-
dresses of the Drews on various websites.149 
 In this case the blogger and institutional publication made differ-
ent choices about protecting the privacy of a minor. Whether the right 
decision was made, as a normative matter, is a hard call. But the defini-
tion of newsworthiness is hardly helpful. One can imagine that the 
newspaper and the blogger each felt strongly about their choice. Sarah 
Wells, a blogger who revealed the first and last names of Lori Drew, 
stated in an e-mail message, “I don’t regret naming Drew.”150 What is 
interesting is to look at the institutional competence of the individuals 
who made that choice. The newspaper reporter was a third-party to the 
events, and made what one assumes to be a dispassionate choice based 
on a historical memory of addressing questions like this in the past. Ms. 
Wells, on the other hand, was a middle-aged mother in Virginia who 
was outraged by the newspaper story and performed her own investiga-
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tion to find Lori Drew’s name to release on her blog.151 Once released, 
the impact was immediate. Subsequent posters revealed her address, 
phone number and business information.152 Her daughter had to leave 
school, but thanks to the Internet’s memory, a record of this will follow 
her forever.153 
 Again, this might be an appropriate outcome. But the binary 
choice of whether personal information of Lori Drew should have been 
published was understood differently by the newspaper and Ms. Wells. 
Should Lori Drew or her daughter wish to pursue a privacy claim 
against Ms. Wells, the legal doctrine that applies would ask whether this 
information is truthful and newsworthy.154 As argued above, this regime 
contemplates certain variables that permit a balance in favor of permit-
ting publication. Unlike Ms. Wells, the St. Louis Dispatch is in the busi-
ness of distributing news. 
 The important point here is that the legal doctrine for balancing 
privacy and speech interests contemplates binary publication. News 
intermediaries are presumed to have a worldwide audience and create 
a lasting record. Their choice to publish imbues the subject of the pub-
lication with worthiness to become part of the public record. The doc-
trine presumes that choices are made to keep certain things private, 
and this is an acceptable burden on free speech.155 Choices to publish 
are made for the furtherance of speech values we cherish.156 
 Ms. Wells’ decision to publish private facts may have come after a 
thoughtful internal debate about whether the information was news-
worthy. But in a world of millions of potential citizen journalists and 
bloggers, only one less-thoughtful speaker has to release private facts, 
for any reason they deem valid, for information to become part of the 
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public record. This applies to any personal information about them-
selves or others. If the information is newsworthy, it is not entitled to 
any privacy protection. 
B. Choice of Where to Publish 
 Professor Lior Strahilevitz identified the problem courts have in 
applying the public-private distinction to determine if individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in facts disclosed to a small group.157 
He asked whether social networking theory could provide empirical re-
sults useful to courts in determining whether a certain fact would have 
become public based on disclosure to one member of a community.158 
His work is premised on the assumption that the law should not treat 
disclosure as a binary choice; one should not give up all legal recourse 
based on a single disclosure if, empirically, it can be proved that that 
disclosure would not have likely led to broad knowledge of the fact at 
issue.159 
 Publication to a global communications medium raises a question 
of far greater scope and scale than Strahilevitz’s work assumes. But at 
issue is the same question of whether certain disclosures are worth in-
centivizing, or, put differently, whether the social good from encourag-
ing people to post their stories outweighs the harm to free speech from 
stopping others from re-publishing those stories. If the social value se-
cured by disclosures that fill in the blurry edge of our social networks is 
worth capturing, then the law needs to change to protect the privacy of 
private information once disclosed, even beyond what Strahilevitz pro-
poses. 
 In 2009, in Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., the California Court of 
Appeals wrestled with the question of whether publishing information 
on a public network available to the world could be considered private 
if the intent was to reach only a limited audience.160 Cynthia Moreno 
wrote a negative post about her hometown called “An ode to Coalinga,” 
and posted it on her MySpace web-page.161 A reader submitted the ode 
to the local newspaper, The Coalinga Record, and it was published in the 
Letters to the Editor section.162 It was attributed to Cynthia, using her 
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full name.163 A significant backlash resulted, with the Moreno family 
receiving death threats and having to close the family store.164 
 Cynthia and her family sued the newspaper for, among other 
things, a violation of the public disclosure of private facts tort.165 The 
court ruled that there were no private facts at issue because “[a] matter 
that is already public or that has previously become part of the public 
domain is not private.”166 The court noted that an individual who pub-
lished information on the Internet could not have a reasonable expec-
tation that it would remain private, finding that “the fact that Cynthia 
expected a limited audience does not change the above analysis. By 
posting the article on Myspace, Cynthia opened the article to the public 
at large. Her potential audience was vast.”167 
 Here, one might imagine that Cynthia’s intent was to reach an au-
dience other than the town newspaper, but she had no way to indicate 
that to her readers. And even after she decided to remove the post 
from her MySpace page, she had already lost control of the ode be-
cause someone had copied it.168 MySpace and other social networking 
sites create the illusion of limited publication and control, but there is 
no technological mechanism for users to effectuate that control, nor 
law that recognizes those decisions. 
IV. A Proposal for a Technological Solution 
 Internet users are releasing incredible amounts of personal con-
tent online, often without the means to communicate their privacy 
preferences or limit third-party uses of this content.169 Once disclosed, 
users largely surrender control over this information. The result is 
more expression, but also more potential for privacy harms and abuse. 
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Without more control, users may face the adverse consequences of un-
wanted scrutiny and eventually become more reluctant to generate and 
share content. A technological solution that empowers users to express 
their privacy preferences with regard to content they share would be a 
valuable way to provide some privacy protections while protecting im-
portant free speech interests. 
 One option would be a tool for users to express and exercise pri-
vacy preferences over uploaded content. It would permit users to ex-
press their intentions by tagging any uploaded content with an icon 
that immediately conveys privacy preferences to third parties. Based on 
a Creative Commons model,170 this tool would provide immediate vis-
ual feedback to third parties about the content owner’s preferences 
and link to a website that provides more detailed guidance about how 
the content may be used or shared. It could also allow third parties to 
ask publishers to remove content they prefer not be published. 
 Social norms in online communities, as well as existing principles 
of law, promote neighborly respect for expressed privacy preferences.171 
Websites have long been able to signal to search engines their intention 
to keep certain pages private by embedding metadata.172 Search en-
gines overwhelmingly respect these preferences.173 For example, when 
a person tags their webpage with a particular metatag, search engines 
voluntarily skip the page and do not include it in their databases.174 A 
similar metadata system targeted at individual postings or pictures 
could create a widely accepted social norm regarding privacy prefer-
ences. Commercial and individual users alike are likely to be more hesi-
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tant to abuse user privacy preferences when such preferences appear 
clearly alongside the relevant content. 
 Enhancing privacy will likely promote voluntary content sharing; 
because this is the goal, the model needs to be deployed in a way that 
does not limit users to only particular websites or environments. Much 
user-generated content is already available without requiring users to 
login to access the content, and gate-keeping measures do little to stem 
the easy flow of content across communities and hosts.175 To be effec-
tive, the privacy tool should be equally mobile. By the same token, to 
ensure widespread adoption and full use, it should be available to all 
consumers of user-generated content at the click of a button, regardless 
of whether they are members or authenticated users of the particular 
environment in which it is deployed. 
 Similarly, privacy preferences expressed with the tagging tool 
should not trigger mandatory enforcement by technological means. 
Such a “kill switch” for content would defeat the ultimate objective of 
promoting content sharing, and severely chill speech online. Simple 
neighborliness requires that we honor each other’s privacy preferences 
until and unless they conflict with stronger interests or implicate free 
speech values. When such a situation occurs it should be possible to 
override another user’s preferences. Automatic enforcement of ex-
pressed privacy preferences would disrupt this delicate balance. 
 I believe that Internet users will respect the social force of a plea 
for privacy if they are faced with such a request at the time they access 
online content. The best way to counteract the erosion of privacy that 
results when content of a personal nature is shared online is not to de-
ploy gate-keeping measures and an inflexible hierarchy that privileges 
certain speakers, subjects, or expressed preferences. It is to let simple 
social signals exert their own force across forums. 
 Finally, such a tool could help courts incent public disclosures that 
allow users to capture the value of the blurry edge of their social net-
work by providing some legal privacy protections for them. As Strahilev-
itz and other privacy scholars have long recognized, a regime that treats 
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all disclosures equally as a barrier to claims under the privacy torts fails 
to take into account the benefits and nature of some disclosures.176 
However, a regime that fails to recognize that not everything posted on 
the Internet is meant for every user of the Internet, fails to understand 
the technology and its potential.177 
 A tool that allows users to express their preferences about content 
they post could lead to other changes in privacy law as well. The privacy 
torts apply an objective test to determine whether a reasonable person 
would have found a particular disclosure offensive.178 This standard 
makes sense because it would be too burdensome to require people to 
calculate the particular sensitivity of an individual in advance of publi-
cation. However, if individuals were able to tag content with their pref-
erences, or be provided with a means to contact others to let them 
know they find a particular disclosure to have invaded their privacy, one 
could envision the privacy torts evolving to take account of individual 
privacy expectations. 
Conclusion 
 If we expect Internet users to continue to use Web 2.0 technologies, 
we need to provide tools to enable them to make more granular deci-
sions about the privacy of the content they post. Some may continue to 
publish even in the absence of such protections, but many will stop ex-
pressing themselves and refrain from building online communities as 
they experience the harms of privacy violations. A tool which provides 
users with some means to express their preferences as to their content 
coupled with concurrent changes in current privacy tort law to recog-
nize those preferences would offer Internet users some privacy protec-
tions while maintaining equally important protections for speech. 
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